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Introduction
The “mirror world” (Spiegelwelt or Gegenwelt) was introduced by Jakob von Uexküll (1920; 
Bernhard Hassenstein 2001). It marks a metabletic (Bertha Mook 2009; Jan Hendrik van 
den Berg 1956) turn in the life sciences of the first quarter of the 20thc., contemporary with 
major paradigm shifts in physics (e.g., Albert Einstein 1905; Niels Bohr 1905-1911; Erwin 
Schrödinger 1926; …), philosophy (e.g., Edmund Husserl 1913; Alexius Meinong 1899; Brett 
Buchanan 2008; …), psychology (e.g., Carl Stumpf 1918; Max Wertheimer 1922-3; Wolfgang 
Köhler 1929; …), and the arts (for instance, Rainer Maria Rilke (1902) in poetry and Franz 
Marc (1880–1916) in painting). Augmented with somewhat later ideas concerning the 
genesis of awareness (Schrödinger 1958; Jason Walter Brown 1991; …) and methods of 
probing (Whitman Richards 1982; Jan Koenderink 2011a; …) one obtains a rough, but 
coherent account of the psychogenesis of visual awareness.
I start by introducing the concept of mirror world (Spiegelwelt) and so forth, then 
discuss their role in an ontology of the objects of visual awareness, the Gestalts.
Foundations
Jakob Von Uexküll’s Ethology
Jakob von Uexküll (1864–1944) is the father of ethology, which was “officially” launched 
with the 1973 Nobel Prize in Medicine awarded jointly to Karl von Frisch, Konrad Lorenz and 
Nikolaas Tinbergen. I give a summary account of some of his main ideas here.
Animals strike us because of their autonomic behavior. They apparently act by 
monitoring and acting on their environment (Umgebung). The repertoire of actions is 
limited to an action world (Wirkwelt) and the repertoire of the monitoring is limited to a 
sensed world (Merkwelt). 
Human Wirkwelt is largely limited to the displacement of masses, deformation of 
solids, secretion of hormones, and so forth. Alien creatures eject ink clouds (cuttlefish), 
create electric shocks (electric eel), change color (chameleon), emit ultrasound (bats), spin 
webs (spider) and so forth, thus have a very different Wirkwelt. 
Human Merkwelt includes rudimentary chemical and mechanical senses, air vibrations 
and electromagnetic radiation in limited parameter regions. Alien creatures detect electric 
Jan Koenderink: Ontology of the Mirror World – 20/04/15
Page 1 of 21
Jan Koenderink: Ontology of the Mirror World – 20/04/15
Page 2 of 21
Jan Koenderink: Ontology of the Mirror World – 20/04/15
Page 3 of 21
fields (sharks), hear ultrasonic sounds (bats), see polarization states of the electromagnetic 
field (honeybee), use infrared thermal imaging (rattlesnake), and so forth, thus have a very 
different Merkwelt. 
The union of Merkwelt and Wirkwelt makes up the Umwelt of an animal, necessarily 
correlated with a small corner of “the” Umgebung. Animals living in the same environment 
have different Umwelts. To the extents that their Umwelts are distinct, they are necessarily 
mutually alien (Thomas Nagel 1974). A lantern pole is a different object to me walking by it, 
my dog sniffing it, a dove sitting upon it, or a moth flying around its lantern. We do different 
things with it: “What I do is me, for that I came” (Gerard Manley Hopkins 1918).
All animals are complete and perfect as they are. A mole is not blind and humans don’t 
lack wings. Umwelts may be very different, yet animals interact by way of the Umgebung. 
The Umgebung is common to all, although nobody can experience it as such. Interaction is 
not to be confused with “communication”. 
The spider and the fly have different Umwelts that are evidently “in tune” in the sense 
that the spider’s web is mechanically and geometrically fit to fool flies – they can’t see the 
threads – and catch them – right mesh size, sufficient mechanical strength, …. Yet spider 
babies spinning their first web are neither handed a “fly-manual”, nor learn from experience. 
Such correspondences are the rule, all animals live in symbiosis with countless others. 
We depend for our lives on our cells, the mitochondria in these cells, on numerous bacteria 
in our guts, on chickens, on pigs and apple trees and these in turn depend on us. Von 
Uexküll’s simile of each organism contributing its solo voice to a huge orchestra is both 
charming and apt. Unfortunately, such ideas stamped him a “vitalist” – unmentionable in 
late 1930’s biology – and effectively led to the end of his career, leaving his ideas to be 
harvested by colleagues who where smart enough to jump the Darwinean bandwagon. This 
controversy tragically divided biology in the early 20th c. (Geert Jan de Klerk 1979). Von 
Uexküll’s proto-cybernetic reasonings were only partly understood by either side.
Simplest animals are understood via a loop (Funktionskreis) that runs through the 
animal’s body and its environment. The body is part of the environment, the loop an 
abstract, formal object having neither beginning nor end (figure 1). I start my description 
arbitrarily at the sensor (Merkorgan). When some interaction at the sensitive body surface 
stimulates the sensor, it sends a message to the effector (Wirkorgan). The effector changes 
the environment, leading to a change in stimulation of the sensor, thereby closing the loop. 
Fig. 1 A “magical” tunnel dug by the pea weevil larva. Why “magical”? Why, the larva has no use for the tunnel. 
It will never use it. It plays no functional role in its life. We understand its function if we grant that the larva 
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and the beetle “sing a duet” together – in von Uexküll’s terms – although they don’t even know each other. In 
the pea weevil universe the larva and beetle do not exist in some temporal order, nor simultaneously. It is 
typical for loops that they have beginning nor end, like the proverbial chicken and egg loop.
The physical event leading to stimulation of the sensor evokes a message that is fully unlike 
it. The message may be an electrochemical, neural event, whereas the stimulation might be 
mechanical, chemical, photic, acoustic, thermal, or whatever. “Messaging” simply means any 
process that stimulates the effector. The effect is fully unlike the message, a muscle twitch, 
glandular secretion, and so forth. “Messaging” is not “communication”! The effector knows 
nothing of the sensor, or vice versa, they share no language. The loop closes through the 
environment. Here the “messaging” between effector and sensor is physical causation. 
Such simple systems allow surprisingly complicated behavior (Valentino Braitenberg 
1984). They can be almost arbitrarily specific given the properties of the sensor and effector. 
Only certain properties of the environment can affect behavior, these are the 
“cues” (Merkmale). Objects involved in the interaction are “cue bearers” (Merkmalsträger or 
Gegengefüge). Von Uexküll’s examples are striking and have been quoted frequently in the 
philosophical literature (Jui-Pi Chien 2006).
Von Uexküll was able to perform such analyses because he studied simple marine 
creatures, for which he had “God’s Eye” (Koenderink 2014a). He positioned himself more 
advantageously than Sigmund Freud (1900) could. Humans cannot really study the human 
Funktionskreise, because humans are what we are. Freud tried, but – of course – he lacked 
the God’s Eye view for humans, as we all do.
With the “new loop” (neuer Kreis) von Uexküll (1920) introduces a loop controller 
between the sensor and the effector that simulates the causal structure of the environment 
(figure 2). The effector receives its messages from the controller, rather than from the sensor. 
The sensor also sends direct messages to the controller, a kind of “first warning”, protopathic 
alerts. More importantly, the controller maintains two-way messaging with the sensor in 
which the sensor plays a passive, the controller an active role. The controller “pokes” the 
sensorium and thus “feels for friction”. This implements a “counter world” (Gegenwelt) or 
“mirror world” (Spiegelwelt). 
Fig. 2 Von Uexküll’s Neuer Kreis short-circuits the part of the loop through the environment. This part has 
been dashed, only the Innenwelt being fully drawn. The “world” has been reduced to a “cue 
bearer” (Merkmalsträger). Von Uexküll did not bother to draw it. It plays no role except as a link in the whole 
chain.
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This is the basis for the intentional “inner world” (Innenwelt), which is the animal’s reality 
(Wirklichkeit), whereas the Gegengefüge is the Kantian Ding an sich (Immanuel Kant 1781), 
the God’s Eye view (Koenderink 2014a, Realität). The Innenwelt is an object of experimental 
phenomenology, rather than science. It is the world from the animal’s perspective. This 
notion led to Rilke’s poem Der Panther (1902) and Marc’s remarkable paintings and 
drawings (early 20thc.). Rilke strifes for “in-seeing” (Einsehen), experiencing the animal from 
its inside so to speak (“… letting oneself into the dog, exactly into its center, to the place 
where it starts being a dog …”). Von Uexküll describes it in his Streifzüge (1934). It made a 
huge impact on “continental philosophy” (Chien 2006).
The functionality of the new loop implies the Reafferenzprinzip usually attributed to 
Erich von Holst and Horst Mittelstaedt (1950) who published it two decades after von 
Uexküll did, without reference – perhaps they were scared of being stamped vitalists 
themselves. It has become a basic principle in sensorimotor physiology and a foundation of 
James Gibson’s (1950) “direct perception” in psychology. Since loops have neither beginning 
nor end, perception is “direct” that is literally timeless once you’re in an active sensorimotor 
loop.
Elements in the loops are not to be identified with physical or physiological objects. Nor 
need they be simple. The Merkorgan and Wirkorgan could be a single physiological organ 
regarded from different perspectives. For instance, an army is an organism in which “the 
soldiers” (single object!) is both a Merkorgan and a Wirkorgan, assembled of numerous 
men. The army has a strict hierarchy with the general at top, in which message passing 
between levels is highly asymmetric – there is no “communication”. “Meanings” and 
“qualities” differ on all levels. Yet the functioning of the “the army” can be aptly described in 
terms of von Uexküll’s functional cycle, including the neuer Kreis.
In more complicated cases one speaks of the Situationskreis (Thure von Uexküll 1986). 
Here the controller is influenced by the emotional core, situational awareness, drives, and so 
forth. These set its mode of operation, for instance, the questions it poses in probing the 
sensorium, or the default actions triggered by protopathic alerts. The mirror world is 
necessarily experienced in some mood (Martin Heidegger 1927). Von Uexküll (1934) 
illustrates this with wonderful observations of the behavior of the hermit crab in various 
Stimmungen.
Erwin Schrödinger’s Sparks of Awareness
From a psychologist’s perspective von Uexküll is positioned close to behaviorism. However, 
he speculated about a “functional tone” acquired by objects in the mirror world. This notion 
is superficially similar to Gibson’s (1966, 1979, almost half a century later) notion of 
“affordance”. However, the difference is categorical. Gibson seeks the “throwability” of a 
stone in the stone, whereas von Uexküll finds it in the functional relation of the animal to the 
Umgebung. His example of the toad trying to eat match sticks provides a biological model of 
affordance. The “seek image” (Suchbild) deserves to be central in the understanding of 
perceptual awareness. 
Jan Koenderink: Ontology of the Mirror World – 20/04/15
Page 4 of 21
Jan Koenderink: Ontology of the Mirror World – 20/04/15
Page 5 of 21
Jan Koenderink: Ontology of the Mirror World – 20/04/15
Page 6 of 21
Affordances are what experiences mean in terms of living. There is no meaning in pure 
physics, meaning is self-imposed by sentient beings. Gibson failed to acknowledge this. It is 
the first stage of metaphor and symbolization (Ernst Cassirer 1944). Symbols common to all 
cultures have deep biological roots. This is even more evident from the fact that plants 
display structures of animal – and human – significance. For instance, many – themselves 
blind! – flowers offer striking visual Gestalts.
“Affordance” gained importance in philosophy due to Heidegger’s  (1926) musings on 
tools. Tools become “part of” the body. The blind man’s cane is an example. Much of the 
world becomes invisible that way, a good thing too, for you could hardly survive otherwise. 
Examples of invisible tools are the ground you walk on and the air that surrounds you. You 
simply take these for granted, except in extreme situations. Tools extend the body, the body 
itself is just another tool of the mind, the one most familiar.
Despite such major ideas, von Uexküll, as a biologist, stays on the side of the sciences, 
rather than phenomenology. His “functional tone” (Suchton, Leistungston) points to the 
Innenwelt but cannot possibly intrude it, as he keenly understood. In order to talk about 
awareness proper one needs to cross the gap between behavior and phenomenology. Biology 
offers no such bridge.
Science cannot account for awareness in physical/physiological terms. All one can do is 
come up with a “psychophysical bridging proposition” that – by design – cannot possibly 
conflict with science, but has heuristic value. Science considers such attempts meaningless, 
both formally correct and intolerably restrictive. Odd enough, whereas “mechanisms” are 
strictly out, various have been proposed by “scientists”. One of the best known is the “neural 
center of consciousness” (Francis Crick 1995). Almost all such proposals seem childish and 
useless to me, evidently self-contradictory, in conflict with known science, or without 
obvious heuristic value. A singular exception is Schrödinger’s. 
Schrödinger (1956) proposed that a spark of awareness results from the friction 
between intentional poking and the resulting resistance, like the reception of a reply to a 
question. The meaning of the answer is in the question. You can only learn what you are 
ready to ask, but you need an answer to know. You put a question to nature by poking, as the 
blind man does with his cane. The answers depend on the intention of the poking. Especially 
negative answers, that are expectations proven false, are informative. Schrödinger’s 
proposition renders awareness intentional inexistence (Franz Clemens Brentano 1874) – a 
major advance from ethology proper. The “poking” may be understood as Arthur 
Schopenhauer’s (1819) “Will to Live” (Wille zum Leben) or Friedrich Nietzsche’s (1884/88) 
“Will to Power” (Wille zur Macht). Neither is personal, both are universal, at the roots of all 
sentience. Poking originates from mere random action, but may become arbitrarily focussed, 
thus enabling evolutionary development towards intentionality.
Schrödinger’s proposition is in no danger to conflict with present or future scientific 
facts.  Yet it has great heuristic value. It is a safe bet to turn a believer, you can’t lose and 
have much to gain! Once accepted, awareness becomes a series of micro enlightenments due 
to intentional poking. I propose to call these “psychons”. Don’t confuse them with Sir John 
Eccles’ (1994) notions. This epistemology puts experimental phenomenology on the 
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biological track.
Whitman Richards’s Twenty Questions
Richards (1982) noticed that even short volleys of questions suffice for life’s needs. The 
popular game of “Twenty Questions” proves that you have a good chance to guess ANY word 
– English passed the one million (20 bit!) word limit in 2009 – in less than twenty questions. 
The reason is that the human Umwelt is limited and structured, which allows you to ask 
informative questions. Most structures and phenomena repeat numerous times, so you know 
what to expect. Establishing a few unlikely coincidences adds up to virtual certainty. This is 
related to Gerhard Vollmer (1975) and Rupert Riedl’s (1980) “hypothetical realism”. It is the 
basis of the biological evolution of ratio. Richards’s method of knowledge acquisition renders 
knowledge knowledge, that is to say intentional.
I have likened this process to forensic investigation (Koenderink 2011a). Consider an 
example. A dead body is found, possibly murdered. A flock of experts searches the scene of 
the crime for evidence, looking for foot prints, blood stains, DNA traces, possible murder 
weapons, witness accounts, concealed persons, cigarette butts, you name it! The limit is set 
by time, available personnel, financial and scientific resources. The result is an arbitrarily 
large file, most of which will certainly prove to be irrelevant, or will never be even consulted. 
All the detective needs to come up with a plot is a summary. Given the plot, some of the 
collected structure becomes relevant, most need never be consulted. It may be necessary to 
ask for additional data. Obtaining such additional data is expensive, so the plot is useful in 
deciding what might be relevant. 
If the plot proves unfruitful, the detective drops it for another. He needs a plot that 
leads to the identification of a number of unlikely events. Probabilities of independent events 
multiply, a few suffice to get “beyond reasonable doubt”. Once you’re in the right direction 
you can select the “evidence” and ignore the rest. Wrapping up the case becomes routine. 
That is how Sherlock Holmes can be so uncanningly effective. I dub this mode of knowledge 
acquisition the “Sherlock Model”.
This is the only way to ever solve – most of the time – such cases at all. The alternative 
would be to compute the solution from the forensic file. Although this sounds great, for all 
data is used, it is evidently impossible. This sheer nonsense is what vision research implies 
with “inverse optics” (Tommaso Poggio, Vincent Torre & Christof Koch 1985), essentially the 
method proposed by David Marr (1982). Richards’s account of the Sherlock Model in a 
biological and phenomenological setting fills an important epistemological gap. It was 
initiated by the early attempts at Artificial Intelligence. It replaced passive reception with 
creative construction.
Jason Walter Brown on Psychogenesis
A yet higher level of awareness is understood by Brown on the basis of his studies of patients 
with specific mental disorders. Brown (1991) proposes a very general model that hits the 
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essence of our understanding of psychogenesis. I use “psychogenesis” in preference to 
“microgenesis” (Victor Rosenthal 2003), although I’m aware that both have various other 
uses. Brown’s model is the exact opposite of the mainstream bottom up account of 
perception.
Brown notices that cortices are evolutionary recent additions and understands that they 
serve to articulate, rather than generate. He seeks the origin of awareness in the deep 
structures. Psychogenesis starts with vague emotive feelings, develops over dreamlike states 
to more articulate “final” states as a surge of activity moves towards the neocortex. The 
moment it arrives it dies, further articulation being impossible, the next wave already on its 
way. It is a legato style, systolic process. The “wave” is like a volley of “hallucinations” that 
are checked against the present contents of the sensorium, the superficial structure. What 
does not fit is mercilessly pruned, what fits progressively diversifies and competes in a 
ruthless evolutionary process. The final state represents the currently most likely 
“explanation” of the structure in the sensorium. Reality (Wirklichkeit) is an achievement of 
the mind, although science and analytic philosophy consider it its “input” – very strange, I 
would say even embarrassing.
This is “controlled hallucination”, or “analysis by synthesis”. It is a robust and stable 
engineering method that freewheels in the absence of input, readily deals with lacking data, 
or ambiguity and easily tunes to various “modes”. Algorithms of this type are known as “soft 
computing” (Lofti Zadeh 1994). An instance fitting Brown’s ideas perfectly is “harmony 
seeking” (Zong Woo Geem 2009).
Putting things together
In putting things together (figure 3) I could start at any point in the loop. I use an essentially 
arbitrary entry, think nothing of it.
Fig. 3 From left to right Jakob von Uexküll, Erwin Schrödinger, Jason Walter Brown and Whitman Richards. 
All four are amongst my heroes – of course, I have plenty more. Such people move our understanding forwards, 
where would we be without them?
The sensorium can be simple, as a single receptor cell, or arbitrarily complicated, as the 
human “visual system”. The sensory side of the human visual system includes the eye, and 
dozens of visual areas, the largest being primary visual cortex. This is the “optical 
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sensorium”. What might be its function? 
The mainstream notion is that the bulk of the “inverse optics computations” go on 
there. In my view this misses the boat altogether. Instead, I suggest that the system doesn’t 
compute anything, but is essentially a volatile – continuously overwritten – data buffer of 
formatted and sorted optical structure. As useful and equally meaningless as a forensic file. 
That is to say, most of the structure is irrelevant and will be ignored. When needed in the 
current investigation, it is there, easy to find and convenient to consult. Without ignoring 
almost all optical structure vision would be impossible. Vision research has started to notice 
this (Arien Mack & Irvin Rock 1998; Jeremy Freeman & Eero Simoncelli 2011; others), but 
has yet to draw the ultimate consequences.
Richards’s analysis of the “twenty questions” game yields a powerful handle on how the 
sensorium is structured so as to subserve the Situationskreis function effectively. It provides 
a principled method to describe its structure and function as it applies to the Merkwelt. It 
implements productive creativity.
How is the sensorium used and what uses it? It is the situational loop controller which 
continually generates hallucinations and checks them against the structure in the sensorium. 
This is Brown’s model. It depends on current situational awareness and goals, the “plot”. The 
plot may be changed at any time, (re-)setting the current viewing mode. The controller also 
sends messages to the motor system, so it codetermines – by way of eye, neck and leg 
muscles – the optical structure at the retinal level. The sensorium becomes something like a 
“blackboard architecture” (Daniel Corkill 1991).
Much never ends up in visual awareness because it subserves Gibson’s “direct” 
perception, which is “optically guided behavior”, rather than awareness proper. Awareness 
results from Schrödinger’s psychons, which originate from the confrontation of 
hallucinations with the structure in the sensorium. Hallucinations are generated by the 
system, therefore have immediate significance. Anything not self-generated, but impinging 
on the system is alien and void of meaning. Nothing can possibly “enter” awareness. This is 
Giambattista Vico’s (1725)  proto-constructivist VERUM FACTUM. You notice this in small 
children, who will only understand your explanations when “ready for it”. Once ready, they 
won’t even need you, before that, they won’t understand. Grandparents know that.
Awareness is a User Interface
Visual awareness is an aspect of the Situationskreis, neither in the head, nor in the 
environment. It involves current structures and processes that become noted in the 
Spiegelwelt, but somehow point at the Gegengefüge. 
Organisms are constantly scheming for the future. The past is irrelevant to survival. 
They already succeeded doing so! The present simply is. There is nothing they can do to 
change it. It is their future that organisms need to deal with. There is still a chance to modify 
it! This works mostly undercover, automatically. Even awareness is almost never fully 
articulate. It has to contain various futures simultaneously, thus is necessarily ambiguous 
and fluid. In experimental phenomenology we strife for unique reports, thus forcing the 
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system. This intervention co-determines results. Multiple worlds in awareness (Koenderink 
2001) are what yield the sense of freedom of choice, although decisions-in-action tend to be 
involuntary.
An apt description is “visual awareness is an optical user interface” (Donald Hoffman 
2009; Koenderink 2011a). Visual objects are “icons” of the interface, this is the mirror world. 
Another apt term might be Gerard Manley Hopkins’s “inscape”. The Spiegelwelt is reality, 
“the mirror turned lamp” (Meyer Abrams 1953). Visual objects are part of your reality 
(Wirklichkeit). If you kick a rock – as Samual Johnson famously did after hearing a sermon 
by George Berkeley (1709), see James Boswell (1791) – you will hurt your toes. The interface 
is hard-core REALITY! 
Hypothetical realism should not be confused with idealism. Yet Wirklichkeit is not 
Realität, the “physical world”, conventionally called “reality”. The physical world is a super-
individual creation of Homo Sapiens. Realität contains objects like X-rays, galaxies and 
viruses that have no place in anyone’s Wirklichkeit. It is a metabletic construct. The aether 
belonged to it in the 19th c., the superluminal neutrinos for a few months of 2012, the Higgs 
boson since last year. The heart used to be the site of the soul, but since William Harvey 
(1628) it is a pump and since Christiaan Barnard’s operation (december 1967) it can be 
replaced, whereas the soul has turned into an epiphenomenon of the brain (Daniel Dennett 
1996). If you believe in God’s Eye even physics that will be discovered centuries from now is 
part of “reality”. I’m not a believer and would strongly advice against it, but mainstream 
science – at least silently – is.
That you are aware of the interface, rather than the raw optical structure is evident 
from experiments with fragmented spatiotemporal optical structure (Koenderink et al. 
2012a, b). A movie in which both time and space are locally scrambled is experienced as 
smooth and normal. Inverse optics would ideally yield a “veridical” result, which would then 
have to look scrambled! But it does not, the interface has no template for scrambled scenes. 
It only presents you with likely narratives – though not necessarily physically possible ones. 
Psychogenesis assumes that anything goes in principle, but only generates what does fit its 
current generic structures. If purple stones start falling upwards tomorrow you’ll soon get 
used to that. “Veridicality” cannot be a goal, because the organism lacks God’s Eye.
Psychogenesis of visual awareness is a proto-rational system, Egon Brunswik’s (1955) 
“ratiomorphic apparatus”. Mere optical structures (Merkbilder) are turned into meaningful 
images (Bedeutungsbilder) through a Procrustean process that forces them into template-
like structures (Suchbilder at various levels). Thus physical structures (Merkmalsträger) are 
reified as intentional “objects” of reality (Wirklichkeit). These are the tools and affordances 
of the reality of hypothetical realism. Most remain subsurface, some make it into reflective 
thought. In the visual arts this is Sir Ernst Gombrich’s (1960) “The Beholder’s Share”.
Rational thought often finds occasion to “correct” immediate awareness, whereas the 
latter is the essential foundation for it. What to side with in this instance of the Liar Paradox 
(attributed to Eubulides of Miletus, 4thc. BCE)? Your choice will reveal you as artist or 
scientist. In any case, proto-rationality should be regarded with awe. It has been honed to fit 
physical structure since our “Last Universal Common Ancestor”, that is four billion years 
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ago! It is far less prone to silly, potentially lethal mistakes than our human ratio (Riedl 1980; 
Vollmer 1975). Newspapers prove this daily beyond all reasonable doubt.
The Role of Templates
Visual objects start out as hallucinations, von Uexküll’s Suchbilder. They become arbitrarily 
articulate and specific, but necessarily possess a template character. You see what you are 
able to see. That is why expert bird watchers see so much more than you.
Template structures are the releasers (Lorenz 1973; Tinbergen 1951) of animal 
ethology. A small warbler may take a cuckoo chick twice its own size for its young, swans 
have been seen to feed fish, apparently taking them for their chicks, and so forth. The 
literature abounds with striking examples (Riedl 1980). How silly can vertebrates be? Is 
Homo Sapiens the singular exception?
Are humans indeed unique in possessing God’s Eye (Koenderink 2014a)? Far from it, 
this anthropocentric notion is easily proven wrong empirically (figures 4 through 7). 
Template structures abound when you care to look for them. Well known examples of such 
templates are the Gestalts. So are the numerous “illusions” that you know to be “unreal” on 
various grounds (Brown 2004), yet stubbornly look the way they do. Reality (Wirklichkeit) is 
an achievement. It doesn’t come for for free, nor by way of some trivial computation.
Fig. 4 Example of a template. These are one-point-perspective renderings of a cube, designed for rather 
different viewing distances. As seen from their “correct” viewpoints they “should” look the same. But this is not 
the case (Sylvia Pont et al. 2012). From any viewpoint human observers rate the three pictures (from left to 
right) as “shallow slab”, “deep corridor” and “cubical”. Psychogenesis does not use perspective reasoning at all, 
but simply applies a template.
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Fig. 5 The visual rays fan out from the eye and fill a hemispherical cone. Thus the model used by psychogenesis 
should be like A, yet for the majority of observers it is more like B: all visual rays parallel (Hermann von 
Helmholtz 1892; Koenderink et al. 2009)! This gives rise to a number of striking “illusions”  (Koenderink et al. 
2010). This is another instance of a surprising template structure that dominates visual awareness.
Fig. 6 The qualitatively distinct local surface shapes as categorized by Carl Friedrich Gauss (1827) in the early 
19thc. However, for centuries the official taxonomy was that due to Leon Battista Alberti (1435) who omitted the 
saddle category (middle). The amazing fact is that nobody noticed! Psychogenesis has templates for cups, caps, 
ridges and ruts, but not for saddles (Koenderink et al. 2014b). This can be seen in the sculptures of most 
historical cultures (Leonard Rogers 1969).
Fig. 7 Two pictorial reliefs (center and right) obtained for an outline drawing by Picasso (left). The observers 
apparently “hallucinated” the relief of the blank interior (Koenderink et al. 2012). Notice the differences 
between these observers. At left the outline is interpolated with some balloon-like surface. At right the observer 
has applied a template appropriate to human dorsal anatomy. Notice the furrow of the spinal column, which 
Picasso never drew but no doubt saw.
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I use Gestalt synonymous with “object of visual awareness”. I could as well have focussed on 
the auditory or haptic modalities. Gestalts come in great variety. Their common nature is 
that they withdraw from analysis, that “nothing can be changed”. Phenomenologically they 
are created and annihilated instantaneously. Some are short living “glimpses”, others seem 
“immutable”. 
It happens frequently that you see something which is immediately replaced with 
something else. You have to be mindful to notice, many people ignore mere glimpses. Such 
Gestalts last only for a moment. Brown’s psychogenesis runs at a systolic cycle of about a 
dozen a second. These are the most fleeting Gestalts – important as they are.
Most people “see everything in front of them” (figure 5), more precisely, experience the 
half-space in front of them as contained in a visual field of about a right angle or less in 
diameter (Koenderink et al. 2009). This “cone of vision” is an immutable Gestalt, recreated 
in each Brownian cycle. Again, you have to be mindful to notice (Helmholtz 1892; Johannes 
Kepler 1604). 
Gestalts are not necessarily of a static nature, Typically they are happenings. A 
handshake is a Gestalt that lasts for seconds, but has no parts (Ekaku Hakuin 18thc. CE). 
There are numerous examples of this. Most have an obvious template character. Happenings 
account for the bulk of your experience. 
A Gestalt may be a simultaneous presence without explicit spatial structure, think of the 
grace of a pose, or the trod of a horse. Space and time do not really enter as frameworks. 
Gestalts surely have “spatiotemporal texture” but they can’t be analyzed in term of that. The 
grace of a human pose is not likely to impress a bird, again suggesting a template character.
Objects of visual awareness are complete and meaningful as they are. The “meaning” is 
not of reflective thought, but visual meaning that cannot be put into words. Objects are not 
assembled from entities – sense data? qualities? – that are themselves not visual objects. 
They spring to life “fully armed” as Athena from the skull of Zeuss. They have a 
physiognomic character that cannot be analyzed. Gestalts are proto-metaphors, or proto-
symbols of strands of experiences, with deep biological roots, like the releasers of birds and 
fishes, our vertebrate kin. They sum up many mutually related experiences, thus give rise to a 
barrage of interpretations.
Gestalts come in perplexing variety. The quest for a full taxonomy is utterly utopic. 
The mirror world is inexhaustible because we never experience its limits. “The eye cannot see 
itself” (William Shakespeare, Julius Caesar, Act 1, Scene 2). Inexhaustible does not imply 
finite. God’s Eye sees much more! Consider a frog starving in front of a pile of dead flies. Its 
“objects” are living flies. It cannot see dead flies, even when just as nourishing and much 
easier to “catch” (Jörg-Peter Ewert 2004). The frog cannot see its limits. Nor can humans.
In a Gestalt “nothing can be changed”, yet Gestalts are largely unpredictable. This is a 
lethal combination that rules out mereological or logical descriptions (Henri Bergson 1907). 
Gestalts share this with works of art (Koenderink 2
011b). The mirror world is an aesthetic dimension. Visual objects “stare at us from the 
outside”, confronting us. Inside and outside become confused because the Funktionskeis has 
no beginning nor end. Wirklichkeit is a hall of mirrors.
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Psychogenesis generates Gestalts in countless numbers, although not many populate 
our immediate visual awareness at any time. They don’t mutually interact. They don’t have 
parts and they don’t depend on being part of anything. They are pure individuals. 
“No two created beings are exactly alike. And their individuality is no 
imperfection. On the contrary, the perfection of each created thing is not 
merely its conformity to an abstract type but in its own individual identity 
with itself.” (Thomas Merton 1949) 
The mirror world has a flat ontology. Difference or similarity are neither visual objects, nor 
qualities, in that sense objects of the mirror world are fully autonomous. Recreated any 
moment, visual objects cannot change, or “do” anything. An illusion of mereological 
structure is perhaps suggested by such objects as a “swarm of birds”. But the swarm is not 
“made up of birds”, it just has “birdie” qualities. It is a unique visual object. Instead of 
assembling parts, psychogenesis freely creates novel Gestalts like swarms (David Elkind 
1964) or happenings (Albert Michotte 1954).
Nor is there any interaction between Gestalts. Any so called “interaction” is itself an 
object (Michotte 1954), a happening. In a flat ontology objects just are. Occasionalism or 
perhaps synchronicity (Carl Gustav Jung 1952) is more apt as a description than causation. 
Awareness – which includes all its objects – is (re-)created from scratch at each moment. 
Gestalts are mutually independent, but reflect each other. Visual awareness is more like 
a densely textured felt than a mere bag of marbles. You can’t really pry it part. It resembles 
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s (1714) monads, which have no windows, yet all reflect each 
other. This reminds one of von Uexküll’s musical poetry of life. Both Leibniz and von Uexküll 
were crucified by analytical philosophy, the one because his monads had to be launched by a 
God and the other because of his vitalism. Very similar capital crimes if you come to think of 
it! We are in no position to laugh at them but should strife to make the best sense we can of 
their important intuitions. The alternative leads to a dead end, the arid desert of analytical 
philosophy.
“Qualities” are properties of Gestalts, but Gestalts are not bundles of qualities, nor is a 
quality a Gestalt. “Red” of a rose is unlike “red” of blood or a carpet. “Red” is an abstract 
symbol, not a visual object, much as “cat” is. “Cat” is not a Gestalt, you can’t see it, although 
one frequently notices Gestalts with a feline quality. In a sense, Gestalts don’t have qualities 
and meanings, but are them – though not as proper parts.
Numerous abstract symbols exist, think of “world”, “nature”, “space”, “time”, “shape” 
and “self”. You cannot possibly “see” these. They are bona fide mental objects, not Gestalts, 
but objects of reflective thought. Examples include the “round square” and the “golden 
mountain” (Meinong 1899). “Nature” and “round square” are in similar categories. Reflective 
thought is distinct from immediate awareness. Thinking you do, whereas awareness happens 
to you.
The mirror world is an aesthetic dimension, it is creative. As Leonardo da Vinci (ca. 
1540) relates, when you keep looking at some old dirty wall – take your time! – you will 
experience wonderful scenes. Their scope is only limited by the scope of your mind: 
…
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For, as on the coloured canvass
Subtle pencils softly blend
Dark and bright, in such proportions
That the dim perspectives end—
Now, perhaps, like famous cities,
Now, like caves or misty capes,
For remoteness ever formeth
Monstrous and unreal shapes. 
…
(Pedro Calderón de la Barca 1629, El príncipe constante, Act I, Scene I. The gardens of 
the King of Fez, by the sea – part). 
In cases where the optical structure readily admits of competing Gestalts – think of the 
Necker cube (Louis Albert Necker 1832), or the duck-rabbit (Anonymous 1892) – you notice 
an alternation that is not quite under voluntary control (Wolfgang Metzger 1936), suggesting 
that psychogenesis created both. Immediate visual awareness is the tip of the iceberg, the 
Brownian systolic cycle yielding much that remains hidden. Any Gestalt can give way to 
something else at the drop of a hat. Literally! A snap of the fingers or a heartbeat might do 
the same. Any Gestalt is mysterious in the sense that one may never exhaust what else it 
might be (John Ruskin 1843-60). This is the notion of “equivalence”, explored by Alfred 
Stieglitz (1925–1934) and Minor White (1963) in photography. “Seeing as” is a corner stone 
of creative vision. It eludes logic as opposites meet and alternatives are not excluded.
All this fit very well with the familiar fact that we see through the eyes of the great 
painters. Van de Berg (1965) was right that the human mind has significantly changed in 
historical time. We are blind to such changes, only coming to know them in retrospect, 
through historical research. How did landscapes look before Claude Monet, nude women 
before Amadeo Modigliani, or animals before Franz Marc? Of course, we’ll never know.
Conclusions
Immediate visual awareness is an optical user interface. Von Uexküll has brought its 
structure and biological origins to our attention. He also speculated on the Innenwelt, the 
phenomenology of the organism’s Wirklichkeit. He developed the concept of “affordance” or 
“functional tone” in a non-Gibsonean way that allowed him to understand the being of the 
cane for the blind. The notion of functional tone still remains on the side of behaviorism 
rather than that of phenomenology. Schrödinger’s proposition bridges this gap. It is a 
powerful heuristic without scientific consequences. That is exactly its strength. Competing 
notions like the “center of consciousness” or Eccles’ quantum-interactionism (1994) make 
meaningless claims. Von Uexküll’s notions augmented with Schrödinger’s proposal fit 
seamlessly in Brown’s account of psychogenesis as controlled hallucination. Mechanisms like 
Richards’ “twenty questions” or Koenderink’s Sherlock Holmes’ method of investigation 
suggest how psychogenesis might be implemented in algorithmic terms.
I borrowed von Uexküll’s term “Mirror World” for my account. It is based on templates 
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(Suchbilder), which means that its objects are limited to what one has learned to see. 
Research on child development (Elkind 1964) and the feats of experts like bird watchers 
corroborate this. The repertoire is probably not fixed. It starts with the vertebrate “core 
systems” (Elisabeth Spelke & Sang Ah Lee 2012; Giorgio Vallortigara et al. 1990) but can be 
further developed, even later in life. In that sense Homo Sapiens seems at least quantitatively 
remarkable. Development implies experience and mindfulness, yet happens at the gut level.
The phenomenology of visual awareness is an ontology of the mirror world. It is a flat 
ontology of Gestalts. This has far reaching implications for phenomenological vision research 
since its Gestalts are not bundles of qualities and notions as space, shape, world, causality, 
have to be reinterpreted. It implies a major deviation from current mainstream convictions. 
Brown (1999) discovered parallels in the philosophy of early (Abhidharmika) Buddhism 
(Theodore Stcherbatsky 1923).
The mirror world is a creative, aesthetic dimension. Therefore the visual arts – not the 
“conceptual arts” – are experimental phenomenology “carried on by other means” (Carl von 
Clausewitz 1832). They are attempts to render the mirror world symbolic and share it with 
others, just as language is such an instrument subserving reflective thought  (Konrad Fiedler 
1887; Susan Langer 1953).
The first task set to cognitive vision, or “apperception”, is like the parsing of a work of 
the visual arts (Koenderink in press), namely an attempt at a taxonomy of the contents of 
visual awareness. It is like the task set to Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden. The human 
mind appears made for that. “Eye measure” taxonomies of the animal and vegetable 
Kingdoms hardly required correction from DNA-based cladistics. Perhaps surprisingly, 
science did not recognize this for the miracle it surely is, nor ever grasped how it was done. 
Understanding has hardly progressed beyond Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s (1790).
The proper study of awareness is the experimental ontology of the mirror world. Given 
the hall of mirrors structure of the mind it is an experimental ontology of Wirklichkeit. 
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Summary I consider the ontology of the “objects” of immediate visual awareness. The ethological 
account is due to Jakob von Uexküll, from whom I borrow the term “mirror world”. His account is 
essentially behavioristic, thus fails to cross the bridge to phenomenology. Yet, von Uexküll came 
perhaps as close as possible. Erwin Schrödinger’s psychophysical bridging proposition establishes 
this connection. Jason Walter Brown’s account of psychogenesis, based on a lifelong study of mental 
disorders, fits in seamlessly. From an algorithmic perspective it is “analysis by synthesis”. This 
inherently intentional “guessing” strategy for the acquisition of knowledge was proposed by Whitman 
Richards. Visual awareness is a “user interface”, its objects properly called “Gestalts”. It is intentional, 
yet grounded in biology. I attempt to broadly sketch an ontology of this “mirror world”.
Keywords: visual awareness, mirror world, user interface, Gestalt.
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Vorstellung. Das Begriff “Spiegelwelt” entlehne ich Jakob von Uexküll. Seine Deutung ist im 
wesentlichen Verhaltensforschung, damit steht er ausserhalb das Domain der Phänomenologie. Zwar 
kam von Uexküll so nahe heran wie überhaupt möglich. Erwin Schrödinger schlagt eine 
psychophysische Überbrückungsthese vor welche einen Zusammenhang zwischen Verhalten und 
Phänomenologie herstellt. Jason Walter Brown beschrieb die Struktur der Psychogenese auf den 
Basis eines lebenslangen Studium psychischen Störungen wie Seelenblindheit und Hallucination. 
Seine Beschreibung fügt sich hier nahtlos ein. Von einer algorithmischen Perspektive kann man es als 
sogenannten  "Analyse durch Synthese" auffassen.  Diese Strategie des “gezieltes Raten" für die 
Schöpfung von Erkenntniss wurde von Whitman Richards entwickelt. Die Vorstellung ist eine 
"Benutzerschnittstelle", ihre Objekte sind die "Gestalten” der empirischen Phänomenologie.  Es 
existiert zwar ausserhalb, ist doch indirekt gewurzelt in der Biologie. Ich versuche die Ontologie 
dieser “Spiegelwelt” in ihren rohen Umrisse zu skizzieren.
Schlüsselwörter: Vorstellung, Spiegelwelt, Benutzerschnittstelle, Gestalt.
References
Abrams, M. H. (1953): The Mirror and the Lamp: Romantic Theory and the Critical Tradition. New 
York: Oxford University Press.
Alberti, L. B. (1435): De Pictura. (Numerous translations throughout the centuries. Available on the 
Internet.)
Anonymous (1892): An unattributed drawing from the 23 October 1892 issue of Fliegende Blätter 
entitled ”Welche Thiere gleichen einander am meisten?”. (Available on the Internet.)
Berg, J. H. van den (1956): Metabletica. Nijkerk: Callenbach.
Bergson, H. (1907): L’Evolution Créatice. Paris : Les Presses universitaires de France, 1959, 86e 
édition.
Berkeley, G. (1709): An Essay towards a new Theory of Vision. Dublin: Printed for Aaron Rhames, at 
the back of Dick’s Coffee-House for Jeremy Pepyat, Bookseller in Skinner-Row. (Numerous modern 
editions and translations.)
Bohr, N. (1905–1911). See: N. J. Rud, ed. (2008)  Volume 1: Early Work (1905–1911). Niels Bohr 
Collected Works. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Boswell, J. (1791): The Life of Samuel Johnson, LL.D. Modern reprint (1986): Hibbert, C. (ed.) The 
Life of Samuel Johnson. New York: Penguin Classics.
Braitenberg, V. (1984): Vehicles: Experiments in synthetic psychology. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Brentano, F. C. (1874): Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt. Leipzig: Verlag von Duncker & 
Humblot.
Brown, J. W. (1991): Self and Process. New York: Springer-Verlag.
Brown, J.W. (2004): The illusory and the real. Mind and Matter 2, 37–59.
Brown, J. W. (1999): Microgenesis and Buddhism. Philosophy East and West 49(3), 261–277.
Brunswik, E. (1955): ‘Ratiomorphic’ models of perception and thinking. Acta Psychologica 11, 108–
109. 
Buchanan, B. (2008): Onto-Ethologies: The Animal Environments of Uexküll, Heidegger, Merleau-
Ponty, and Deleuze. Albany New York: State University of New York Press.
Jan Koenderink: Ontology of the Mirror World – 20/04/15
Page 16 of 21
Jan Koenderink: Ontology of the Mirror World – 20/04/15
Page 17 of 21
Jan Koenderink: Ontology of the Mirror World – 20/04/15
Page 18 of 21
Calderón de la Barca, P. (1629): El príncipe constante. Transl. Denis Florence McCarty, Dramas of 
Calderon, tragic, comic and legendary, Vol. 1, London: Charles Dolman, 1853. (Available on the 
Internet.)
Cassirer, E. (1944): An Essay on Man: An Introduction to a Philosophy of Human Culture. New 
Haven: Yale University Press.
Chien, J.-P.  (2006): Of Animals and Men: A Study of Umwelt in Uexküll, Cassirer, and Heidegger. 
Concentric: Literary and Cultural Studies 32, 57–79. 
Clausewitz, C. von (1832): Vom Kriege. Berlin: Ferdinand Dümmler.
Corkill, D. D. (1991): Blackboard Systems. AI Expert 6 (9), 40–47.
Crick, F. (1995): The Astonishing Hypothesis. The Scientific Search For The Soul. New York: Scribner 
(reprint edition).
Dennett, D. C.  (1996): The Intentional Stance (6th printing). Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT 
Press.
Eccles, J. C. (1994): How the Self Controls its Brain. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
Einstein, A. (1905): Über einen die Erzeugung und Verwandlung des Lichtes betreffenden 
heuristischen Gesichtspunkt. Annalen der Physik (Berlin) 322 (6), 132–148.
Elkind, D. (1964): Studies in perceptual development II, part-whole. Child Development 35(1), 81–
90.
Ewert J.-P. (2004): Motion perception shapes the visual world of amphibians, in Prete F.R. (ed.) : 
Complex Worlds from Simpler Nervous Systems. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, pp. 117–
160.
Fiedler, C. (1887): Der Ursprung der künstlerischen Thätigkeit. Leipzig: Hirzel.
Freeman, J & Simoncelli E. P. (2011): Metamers of the ventral stream. Nature Neuroscience 14, 
1195–1201.
Freud, F. (1900): Die Traumdeutung. Leipzig und Wien: Franz Deuticke.
Gauss, C. F. (1827): Disquisitiones generales circa superficies curvas. Commentationes Societatis 
Regiae Scientarum Gottingensis Recentiores Classis Mathematicae, VI (1828), 99–146, presented 8 
october 1827. (Various translations available.)
Geem, Z. W. (2009): Music-inspired Harmony search Algorithm. New York: Springer.
Gibson, J. J. (1950): The Perception of the Visual World. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Gibson, J. J. (1966): The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Gibson, J. J. (1979): The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Goethe, J. W. von (1790): Versuch die Metamorphose der Pflanzen zu erklären. Gotha: Ettingersche 
Buchhandlung.
Gombrich, E. (1960): Art and Illusion. A Study in the Psychology of Pictorial Representation. 
London: Phaidon.
Hakuin, E. (1686-1769): Oral tradition, attributed to Hakuin.
Jan Koenderink: Ontology of the Mirror World – 20/04/15
Page 17 of 21
Jan Koenderink: Ontology of the Mirror World – 20/04/15
Page 18 of 21
Jan Koenderink: Ontology of the Mirror World – 20/04/15
Page 19 of 21
Harvey, W. (1628): Exercitatio Anatomica de Motu Cordis et Sanguinis in Animalibus. Francofvrti: 
Gvilielmi Fitzeri.
Hassenstein, B. (2001): Jakob von Uexküll (1864-1944), in Jahn, I. & Schmitt, M. (eds.): Darwin & 
Co. Eine Geschichte der Biologie in Portraits. Band II. München: Verlag C.H.Beck. 
Heidegger, M. (1927): Sein und Zeit. Tübingen: Niemeyer, 19th ed. (2006). 
Helmholtz, H. (1892). Physiologische Optik, 2nd ed. Leipzig: Leopold Voss.
Hoffman, D. (2009): The interface theory of perception: Natural selection drives true perception to 
swift extinction, in Dickinson, S. Tarr, M., Leonardis, A. & Schiele, B. (eds.): Object categorization: 
Computer and human vision perspectives. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 148–165.
Hopkins, G. M. (1918): As Kingfishers Catch Fire, in Bridges, R. (ed.): Poems of Gerard Manley 
Hopkins. London: Humphrey Milford.
Holst, E. von & Mittelstaedt, H. (1950): Das Reafferenzprinzip. Naturwissenschaften 37, 464–476.
Husserl, E. (1913): Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. 
Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie, in Husserl, E. (ed.): Jahrbuch für 
Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung.  Halle/Saale 1913, I. Bd., 1. Teil, 1–323.
Jung, C. G. (1993) [1952]: Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle. Bollingen, Switzerland: 
Bollingen Foundation.
Kant, I. (1781): Critik der reinen Vernunft. Riga: Johann Friedrich Hartknoch.
Kepler, J. (1604): Ad Vitellionem paralipomena, quibus Astronomiae Pars Optica. Francofurti: 
Claudium Marnium & Haeredes Ionnis Aubrii.
Klerk, G. J. M. de (1979): Mechanism and Vitalism. A history of controversy. Acta Biotheoretica 
28(1), 1–10
Koenderink, J. J. (2001): Multiple visual worlds. Perception  30, 1–7.
Koenderink, J. J., van Doorn, A. J. & Todd, J. T. (2009): Wide distribution of external local sign in 
the normal population, Psychological Research 73, 14–22.
Koenderink, J. J., Doorn, A. van, Ridder, H. de & Oomes, S. (2010): Visual rays are parallel. 
Perception 39, 1163–1171.
Koenderink, J. J. (2011a):  Vision as a user interface, in Rogowitz, B. E. &  Pappas, T. N. (eds.): SPIE 
Proceedings Vol. 7865: Human Vision and Electronic Imaging XVI,  786504, 1–13.
Koenderink, J. J. (2011b): Gestalts and Pictorial Worlds. Gestalt Theory 33(¾), 289–324.
Koenderink, J. J., Doorn, A. J. van & Wagemans, J. (2012): Picasso in the mind’s eye of the beholder: 
Three-dimensional filling-in of ambiguous line drawings. Cognition 125, 394–412.
Koenderink, J. J., Richards, W. A. &  Doorn, A. J. van (2012): Blow up: A free lunch? i-Perception 3, 
141–145.
Koenderink, J. J., Richards, W. A. & Doorn, A. J. van (2012): Space-time disarray and visual 
awareness. i-Perception 3, 159–165.
Koenderink, J. J. (2014a): The All Seeing Eye? Perception 43, 1–6.
Jan Koenderink: Ontology of the Mirror World – 20/04/15
Page 18 of 21
Jan Koenderink: Ontology of the Mirror World – 20/04/15
Page 19 of 21
Jan Koenderink: Ontology of the Mirror World – 20/04/15
Page 20 of 21
Koenderink, J. J., Doorn, A. J. van & Wagemans, J. (2014b): Local shape of pictorial relief. i-
Perception 5, 188–204.
Koenderink, J. J. (in print): Parts and Wholes in Pictorial Art. Art & Perception.
Köhler, W. (1929): Gestalt psychology. New York: Liveright.
Langer, S. (1953): Feeling and Form: A Theory of Art. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.
Leibniz, G. W. von (1714):  La Monadologie. Reprint 1991 Edition établie par E. Boutroux. Paris: LGF.
Leonardo (ca. 1540): Libro di Pittura. Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana MS Urb. Lat. 1270, 
datable ca 1540; Libro di pittura. Milanese provenance, from the library of Francesco Melzi 
(1491-1570).
Lorenz, K. (1973): Die Rückseite des Spiegels. Versuch einer Naturgeschichte menschlichen 
Erkennens. München: Piper Verlag.
Mack, A. & Rock, I. (1998): Inattentional Blindness. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
Marc, F. (1880–1916): German expressionist painter, founding member of Der Blaue Reiter, best 
known from his paintings of animals as seen from the inside.
Marr, D. (1982): Vision: A Computational Investigation into the Human Representation and 
Processing of Visual Information. New York: Freeman.
Meinong, A. (1899): Über Gegenstände höherer Ordnung und deren Verhältniss zur inneren 
Wahrnehmung. Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane 21, 187–272.
Merton, T. (1949): Seeds of contemplation. Norfolk, Connecticut: New Directions. 
Metzger, W. (1936): Gesetze des Sehens. Erstauflage 1936; 2. erweiterte Auflage Verlag Waldemar 
Kramer, Frankfurt 1953; 3. abermals erweiterte Auflage Verlag Waldemar Kramer, Frankfurt 1975.
Michotte, A. E. (1954): La Perception de la Causalité. Louvain: Publications Universitaires de 
Louvain .
Modigliani, A. (1884–1920): Italian artist working in Paris since 1906.
Monet, C. (1840–1926): French painter usually regarded as the founder of impressionism.
Mook, B. (2009): The Metabletic Method: An Interdisciplinary Look at Human Experience. 
Phenomenology & Practice 3(1), 26–34.
Nagel, T. (1974): What Is It Like to Be a Bat? The Philosophical Review 83(4), 435–450.
Necker, L. A. (1832): Observations on some remarkable optical phaenomena seen in Switzerland; and 
on an optical phaenomenon which occurs on viewing a figure of a crystal or geometrical solid. 
London and Edinburgh Philosophical Magazine and Journal of Science 1 (5), 329–337.
Nietzsche, F. (1922): Der Wille zur Macht I: Versuch einer Umwerthung aller Werthe. Aus dem 
Nachlaß 1884/88 (1922). Leipzig: Alfred Kröner Verlag.
Poggio, T., Torre, V. & Koch, C. (1985): Computational vision and regularization theory. Nature 317, 
314–319.
Pont, S. C., Nefs, H. T., Doorn, A. J. van, Wijntjes, M. W. A, Pas, S. F. te, Ridder, H. de & Koenderink, 
J. J. (2012): Depth in Box Spaces. Seeing and Perceiving 25, 339–349.
Jan Koenderink: Ontology of the Mirror World – 20/04/15
Page 19 of 21
Jan Koenderink: Ontology of the Mirror World – 20/04/15
Page 20 of 21
Jan Koenderink: Ontology of the Mirror World – 20/04/15
Page 21 of 21
Richards, W. A. (1982): How to play Twenty Questions with nature and win. MIT A.I. Memo No. 
660.
Riedl, R. (1980): Biologie der Erkenntnis. Die stammesgeschichtlichen Grundlagen der Vernunft. 
Berlin/Hamburg: Parey.
Rilke, R. M. (1902):  Poem Der Panther written 6.11.1902 im Jardin des Plantes Paris.
Rogers, L. R. (1969): The appreciation of the arts. Vol. 2: Sculpture. London: Oxford University 
Press.
Rosenthal, V. (2003). Microgenesis, immediate experience, and visual processes in reading, in  
Carsetti, A. (ed.): Seeing, thinking, and knowing. Norwell, Massachusetts: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers,  221–244.
Ruskin, J. (1843–60):  Modern Painters (5 vols.) Vol. I (1843) (Parts I and II) Of General Principles 
and Of Truth; Vol. II (1846) (Part III) Of the Imaginative and Theoretic Faculties; Vol. III (1856) 
(Part IV) Of Many Things; Vol. IV (1856) (Part V) Mountain Beauty; Vol. V (1860) (Part VI) Of Leaf 
Beauty (Part VII) Of Cloud Beauty (Part VIII) Of Ideas of Relation (1) Of Invention Formal (Part IX) 
Of Ideas of Relation (2) Of Invention Spiritual. (Numerous reprints available.)
Schopenhauer, A. (1819): Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung. Leipzig: Brockhaus.
Schrödinger, E. (1926): Quantisierung als Eigenwertproblem (Erste Mitteilung). Annalen der Physik 
79(4), 361–376.
Schrödinger, E. (1958): Mind and matter. Cambridge UK: University Press. (Tarner lectures, 1956).
Spelke, E. & Lee, S. A. (2012): Core systems of geometry in animal minds. Philosophical Transactions 
of the Royal Society, B. 367, 2784–2793.
Stcherbatsky, Th. (1923):  The Central Conception of Buddhism and the Meaning of the Word 
"Dharma”. London: Royal Asiatic Society.
Stieglitz, A. (1925–1934): Equivalents, a series of photographs of clouds, generally recognized as the 
first abstract photographic works of art. Images can be found on the Internet.
Stumpf, C. (1918): Empfindung und Vorstellung. Abhandlungen der Königlich-Preußischen 
Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-historische Klasse, vol. 1, 3–116.
Tinbergen, N. (1951): The Study of Instinct. Oxford UK: Clarendon Press. 
Uexküll, J. von (1909): Umwelt und Innenwelt der Tiere. Berlin: J. Springer.
Uexküll, J. von (1920): Theoretische Biologie. Berlin: Verlag von Gebrüder Paetel.
Uexküll, J. von (1921): Umwelt und Innenwelt der Tiere. 2. verm. u. verb. Aufl. Berlin: J. Springer.
Uexküll, J. von (1934): Streifzüge durch die Umwelten von Tieren und Menschen: Ein Bilderbuch 
unsichtbarer Welten. (Sammlung: Verständliche Wissenschaft, Bd. 21.) Berlin: J. Springer (mit 
Kriszat G.).
Uexküll, J. von (1936): Niegeschaute Welten. Die Umwelten meiner Freunde. Ein Erinnerungsbuch. 
Berlin: S. Fischer.
Uexküll, T. von u. a. (ed.) (1986): Psychosomatische Medizin. 3. Auflage. München: Urban & 
Schwarzenberg, 18 ff.
Vallortigara, G,  Zanforlin, G. & Pasti, G. (1990): Geometric modules in animals' spatial 
Jan Koenderink: Ontology of the Mirror World – 20/04/15
Page 20 of 21
Jan Koenderink: Ontology of the Mirror World – 20/04/15
Page 21 of 21
representations: a test with chicks (Gallus gallus domesticus). Journal of Comparative Psychology 
104(3), 248–254.
Vico, G. (1725): Scienza Nuova. Napoli: Muziana. (Various translations available.)
Vollmer, G. (1975): Evolutionäre Erkenntnistheorie. Stuttgart: Hirzel.
Wertheimer, M. (1922/3): (1922) Untersuchungen zur Lehre von der Gestalt, I: Prinzipielle 
Bemerkungen. Psychologische Forschung 1, 47–58; (1923) Untersuchungen zur Lehre von der 
Gestalt, II. Psychologische Forschung 4, 301–350.
White, M. (1963): Equivalence. The Perennial Trend. PSA Journal 29(7), 17–21.
Zadeh, L. A. (1994): Fuzzy Logic, Neural Networks, and Soft Computing. Communication of the ACM 
37 (3), 77–84.
Jan Koenderink (born Stramproy 1943) is a professor emeritus of physics from Utrecht University. 
He publishes in physics, mathematics, psychology, philosophy and computer science. In recent years 
he has focussed on experimental phenomenology, philosophy of mind and the ontology of the visual 
arts. He was awarded an honorific doctoral degree in medicine by the University of Leuven (1987) 
and the “Azriel Rosenfeld Lifelong achievement award” (in computer vision) by the IEEE in 2014. In 
2010 the ECCV founded the biannual “Koenderink Prize” for Fundamental Contributions in 
Computer Vision. He published books on shape (Solid Shape, 1990) and color (Color for the Sciences, 
2010). A number of his ebooks can be freely downloaded from “de Clootcrans Press” (http://
www.gestaltrevision.be/en/resources/clootcrans-press).
Address: Prof.em. dr. dr.h.c. Jan J. Koenderink, Universiteit Leuven (KU Leuven), Laboratorium 
voor Experimentele Psychologie, Tiensestraat 102, bus 3711, B3000 Leuven, België. 
E-Mail: KoenderinkJan@gmail.com
